The first Patriotic War in the history of Russia took place in 1812, when Napoleon I Bonaparte, following his bourgeois ideas, attacked the Russian Empire. All sections of the population rose up against a single enemy, both old and young fought. For such a rise in the national spirit and the entire population with hostility, the war was officially dubbed the Patriotic War.
This event is firmly imprinted in the history of our country and the whole world. The bloody battle between the two great empires was reflected in literature and culture. Napoleon Bonaparte planned to quickly bleed the Russian Empire through quick and well-thought-out attacks on Kyiv, St. Petersburg and Moscow. The Russian army, led by the greatest leaders, fought in the very heart of the country and won, driving the French back beyond the Russian border.
Patriotic War of 1812. Minimum for the Unified State Examination.
At the end of the 18th century, an event occurred in France that claimed thousands and thousands of lives and brought Napoleon I Bonaparte, the overthrown Bourbon dynasty, to the throne. He glorified his name during the Italian and Egyptian military campaigns, establishing the glory of a valiant military leader. Enlisting the support of the army and influential people, he disperses Directory, the main ruling body of France at that time, and appoints himself consul, and soon emperor. Having taken power into his own hands, the French emperor in a short time unfolds a campaign aimed at the expansion of European states.
By 1809, virtually all of Europe had been conquered by Napoleon. Only Great Britain remained invincible. The dominance of the British fleet in the English Channel made the peninsula almost invulnerable. Adding fuel to the fire, the British take away the colonies in America and India from France, thereby depriving the empire of key points of trade. The only correct solution for France would be to deploy a continental blockade to cut Britain off from Europe. But in order to organize such sanctions, Napoleon needed the support of Alexander I, Emperor of the Russian Empire, otherwise these actions would have been meaningless.
Map: Napoleonic Wars in Russia 1799-1812 "The Path of the Napoleonic Wars Before the War with Russia".
Causes
In the interests of Russia was concluded Peace of Tilsit, which was, in fact, a respite for the accumulation of military power.
The main points of the agreement were:
- support for the continental blockade of Britain;
- recognition of all French conquests;
- recognition of the governors appointed by Bonaparte in the conquered countries, etc.
The deterioration of relations was the non-compliance with the points of the agreement of the concluded peace, as well as the refusal to marry Napoleon to Russian princesses. His offer was rejected twice. It was necessary for the French emperor to marry in order to confirm the legitimacy of his title.
Occasion
The main reason for the Russian-French war was the violation of the border of the Russian Empire by French troops. It must be understood that Napoleon was not going to conquer the whole country. His worst enemy was impregnable Great Britain. The purpose of the campaign against Russia was to inflict a military defeat on her and make peace on her own terms against the British.
Members
"Twenty Language", so called the troops of the captured states who joined the French army. The name itself makes it clear that there were many countries participating in the conflict. There were not many allies on the Russian side.
Objectives of the parties
The main reason for this war, as well as all conflicts, was the problem of the division of influence in Europe between France, Britain And Russia. It was in the interests of all three to prevent the absolute leadership of one of the countries.
The following goals were pursued:
Great Britain |
||
|---|---|---|
Make peace with Russia on your own terms. | Throw the enemy army behind your borders. | |
Seize the colonies of Britain in India and win back their own, passing through Russian Asia. | Exhaust the enemy through the tactics of constant retreat inland. | Keep Russia on your side, even after the Peace of Tilsit. |
Weaken Russia's influence in Europe. | Do not leave any resources in the path of Napoleon's army, thereby exhausting the enemy. | Provide allied states with support in the war. |
Use the Russian Empire as a source of resources. | Do not allow France to arrange a continental blockade of Great Britain. | |
Return the old borders with Russia in the form they were before the reign of Peter I. | Deprive France of absolute leadership in Europe. | |
Block Great Britain on the island in order to further weaken it and seize territories. |
balance of power
At the time Napoleon crossed the Russian border, the military power of both sides could be expressed in the following figures:
At the disposal of the Russian army there was also a Cossack regiment, which fought on the side of the Russians on special rights.
Commanders and warlords
The commanders-in-chief of the Great Army and the Russian Army, Napoleon I Bonaparte and Alexander I, respectively, had the most talented tacticians and strategists at their disposal.
From the side France The following commanders should be especially noted:
Louis Nicolas Davout- "iron marshal", marshal of the Empire, who did not lose a single battle. He commanded the Guards Grenadiers during the war with Russia.
Joachim Murat- King of the Kingdom of Naples, commanded the reserve cavalry of the French army. He took a direct part in the Battle of Borodino. Known for his ardor, courage and hot temper.
Jacques MacDonald- Marshal of the Empire, commanded the French-Prussian infantry corps. Served as a reserve power of the Great Army. Covered the retreat of the French military forces.
Michelle Ney one of the most active participants in the conflict. Marshal of the Empire in battle earned the nickname "the bravest of the brave." He fought desperately in the Battle of Borodino, and then covered the retreat of the main parts of his army.
Russian Army she also had many outstanding military leaders in her camp:
Mikhail Bogdanovich Barclay de Tolly- at the beginning of the Patriotic War, Alexander I gave him the opportunity to be the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, with the words, - "I have no other army". He held this post until the appointment of Kutuzov.
Bagration Petr Ivanovich- General of Infantry, commanded the 2nd Western Army at the time the enemy crossed the border. One of the most famous students of Suvorov. He insisted on a general fight with Napoleon. In the Battle of Borodino, he was seriously wounded by a fragment of a scattered cannonball, died in agony in the infirmary.
Tormasov Alexander Petrovich- Russian general who commanded the cavalry of the Russian Army. In the south of the Empire, the 3rd Western Army was under his command. His task was to contain the allies of France - Austria and Prussia.
Wittgenstein Peter Khristianovich- Lieutenant General, commanded the first infantry corps. He stood in the way of the Great Army, which was moving towards St. Petersburg. With skillful tactical actions, he seized the initiative in the battle with the French and pinned down three corps on the way to the capital. In this battle for the north of the state, Wittgenstein was wounded, but did not leave the battlefield.
Golenishchev-Kutuzov Mikhail Illarionovich- Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army in the war of 1812. An outstanding strategist, tactician and diplomat. He became the first full knight of the Order of St. George. During World War II, the French called him "Old fox from the North." The most famous and recognizable man of the war of 1812.
The main stages and course of the war
Command reorganization: approval of Kutuzov for the post of commander-in-chief of the Russian army (August 29, 1812)
Escape from Moscow to Maloyaroslavets
Retreat from Maloyaroslavets to the Berezina
Retreat from the Berezina to the Neman
The division of the Great Army into three directions: Southern, Central, Northern.
March from the Neman River to Smolensk.
March from Smolensk to Moscow.
Retreat of the Great Army.
Map: Patriotic War of 1812
Peace treaty
While in burning Moscow, Napoleon I Bonaparte tried three times to conclude a peace agreement with the Russian Empire.
The first attempt was made with the help of the captured Major General Tutolmin. Feeling his dominant position, Napoleon continued to demand from the Russian emperor a blockade of Great Britain, an alliance with France and the abandonment of the lands conquered by Russia.
The second time the Commander-in-Chief of the Great Army sent with the same negotiator a letter to Alexander I with a peace proposal.
For the third time, Bonaparte sent his general Lauriston to the Russian emperor with the words, - " I need peace, I absolutely need it, by all means, save only honor».
All three attempts were ignored by the command of the Russian Army.
Results and consequences of the war
The Great Army lost about 580 thousand soldiers during the six months of the war on the territory of the Russian Empire. They include deserters, allied troops who fled to their homeland. About 60 thousand people sheltered some fugitives from Napoleon's army in Russia, local residents and the nobility.
The Russian Empire, for its part, also suffered considerable losses: from 150 to 200 thousand people. About 300 thousand people were injured in varying degrees of severity, and about half of them remained disabled.
At the beginning of 1813 The foreign campaign of the Russian army began, which passed through the lands of Germany and France, pursuing the remnants of the Great Army. Pressing Napoleon on his territory, Alexander I achieved his capitulation and captivity. The Russian Empire in this campaign annexed the Duchy of Warsaw to its territory, and the lands of Finland were again recognized as Russian.
The historical significance of the war
Patriotic War of 1812 immortalized in the history and culture of many nations. A large number of literary works are devoted to this event, for example, “War and Peace” by L.N. Tolstoy, "Borodino" M.Yu. Lermontov, O.N. Mikhailov "Kutuzov". In honor of the victory, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior was built, and memorial obelisks stand in the hero cities. Every year, a reconstruction of the battle is held on the Borodino field, where an impressive number of people who want to plunge into the era take part.
References:
- Alexey Shcherbakov - "Napoleon. Winners are not judged.
- Sergei Nechaev - "1812. Hour of pride and glory.
Russian-French war 1812-1814 ended with the almost complete destruction of Napoleon's army. During the fighting, the entire territory was liberated Russian Empire, and the battles switched to and Let us further briefly consider how the Russian-French war went.
start date
The fighting was primarily due to Russia's refusal to actively support the continental blockade, which Napoleon saw as the main weapon in the fight against Great Britain. In addition, Bonaparte pursued a policy towards European countries that did not take into account the interests of Russia. At the first stage of hostilities, the domestic army retreated. Before Moscow passed From June to September 1812, the advantage was on the side of Napoleon. From October to December, Bonaparte's army tried to maneuver. She sought to retreat to winter quarters, located in an undestroyed area. After that, the Russo-French War of 1812 continued with the retreat of the Napoleonic army in conditions of famine and frost.
Prerequisites for battle
Why did the Russo-French War take place? The year 1807 determined for Napoleon his main and, in fact, his only enemy. They were the UK. She captured the French colonies in America and India, created obstacles to trade. Due to the fact that England occupied a good position at sea, Napoleon's only effective weapon was her effectiveness, in turn, depended on the behavior of other powers and their desire to follow the sanctions. Napoleon demanded from Alexander the First a more consistent implementation of the blockade, but constantly met with Russia's unwillingness to break off relations with its key trading partner.
In 1810, our country participated in free trade with neutral states. This allowed Russia to trade with England through intermediaries. The government adopts a protective tariff that raises customs rates, primarily for imported French goods. This, of course, caused the extreme displeasure of Napoleon.
Offensive
The Russian-French war of 1812 at the first stage was favorable for Napoleon. On May 9, he meets in Dresden with allied rulers from Europe. From there he goes to his army on the river. Neman, which separated Prussia and Russia. June 22 Bonaparte addresses the soldiers with an appeal. In it, he accuses Russia of failing to fulfill the Tizil Treaty. Napoleon called his attack the second Polish invasion. In June, his army occupied Kovno. Alexander I at that moment was in Vilna, at the ball.
On June 25, the first clash occurred near the village. Barbarishki. Battles also took place at Rumshishki and Popartsi. It is worth saying that the Russian-French war took place with the support of Bonaparte's allies. The main goal at the first stage was the crossing of the Neman. So, from the south side of Kovno, the Beauharnais (Viceroy of Italy) group appeared, from the north - the corps of Marshal MacDonald, from Warsaw through the Bug the corps of General Schwarzenberg invaded. On June 16 (28) the soldiers of the great army occupied Vilna. On June 18 (30), Alexander I sent Adjutant General Balashov to Napoleon with a proposal to make peace and withdraw troops from Russia. However, Bonaparte refused.
Borodino
On August 26 (September 7), 125 km from Moscow, the largest battle took place, after which the Russian-French war went according to Kutuzov's scenario. The forces of the parties were approximately equal. Napoleon had about 130-135 thousand people, Kutuzov - 110-130 thousand. The Russian army did not have enough guns for 31 thousand militias of Smolensk and Moscow. Pikes were handed out to the warriors, but Kutuzov did not use people as they performed various auxiliary functions - they carried out the wounded and so on. Borodino was actually an assault by the soldiers of the great army of Russian fortifications. Both sides made extensive use of artillery in both attack and defense.
The Battle of Borodino lasted 12 hours. It was a bloody battle. Napoleon's soldiers at the cost of 30-34 thousand wounded and killed broke through the left flank and pushed back the center of the Russian positions. However, they failed to develop their offensive. In the Russian army, losses were estimated at 40-45 thousand wounded and killed. There were practically no prisoners on either side.
September 1 (13) Kutuzov's army was located in front of Moscow. Its right flank was near the village of Fili, the center - between the village. Troitsky and s. Volynsky, left - in front of the village. Vorobyov. The rearguard is located on the river. Setun. At 5 o'clock on the same day, a military council was convened in Frolov's house. Barclay de Tolly insisted that the Russo-French War would not be lost if Moscow was given to Napoleon. He talked about the need to save the army. Bennigsen, in turn, insisted on holding the battle. Most of the rest of the participants supported his position. However, Kutuzov put an end to the council. The Russian-French war, he believed, would be ended with the defeat of Napoleon only if the national army could be preserved. Kutuzov interrupted the meeting and ordered to retreat. By the evening of September 14, Napoleon entered the deserted Moscow.
Exile of Napoleon
The French did not stay long in Moscow. Some time after their invasion, the city was engulfed in fire. Bonaparte's soldiers began to experience a shortage of provisions. The locals refused to help them. Moreover, partisan attacks began, the militia began to be organized. Napoleon was forced to leave Moscow.
Kutuzov, meanwhile, positioned his army in the path of the French retreat. Bonaparte intended to go to cities not destroyed by hostilities. However, his plans were thwarted by Russian soldiers. He was forced to go almost along the same road that he came to Moscow. Because the settlements on the way they were destroyed by him, there were no products in them, as well as people. Exhausted by hunger and disease, Napoleon's soldiers were subjected to constant attacks.
Russian-French war: results
According to Clausewitz's calculations, the great army with reinforcements numbered about 610 thousand people, including 50 thousand Austrian and Prussian soldiers. Many of those who were able to return to Koenigsberg died almost immediately from illness. In December 1812, about 225 generals, a little more than 5 thousand officers, and 26 thousand of lower ranks passed through Prussia. As contemporaries testified, they were all in a very miserable condition. In general, Napoleon lost about 580 thousand soldiers. The remaining warriors formed the backbone new army Bonaparte. However, in January 1813, the battles moved to the lands of Germany. Then the fighting continued in France. In October, Napoleon's army was defeated near Leipzig. In April 1814 Bonaparte abdicated.
Long Term Consequences
What did the won Russian-French war give the country? The date of this battle has firmly gone down in history as a turning point in the issue of Russia's influence on the affairs of Europe. Meanwhile, the strengthening of the country's foreign policy was not accompanied by internal changes. Despite the fact that the victory rallied and inspired the masses, the successes did not lead to reforming the socio-economic sphere. Many peasants who fought in the Russian army passed through Europe and saw that serfdom was abolished everywhere. They expected the same action from their government. However, serfdom continued to exist after 1812. According to a number of historians, at that time there were still no fundamental prerequisites that would lead to its immediate abolition.
But the sharp surge of peasant uprisings, the creation of political opposition in the progressive nobility, which followed almost immediately after the end of the battles, refute this opinion. The victory in the Patriotic War not only rallied people and contributed to the rise of the national spirit. At the same time, the boundaries of freedom expanded in the minds of the masses, which led to the uprising of the Decembrists.
However, not only this event is associated with 1812. The opinion has long been expressed that the entire national culture, self-consciousness received an impetus during the period of the Napoleonic invasion. As Herzen wrote, the true history of Russia is revealed only from 1812. Everything that was before can be considered only a preface.
Conclusion
The Russo-French war showed the strength of the entire people of Russia. Not only the regular army participated in the opposition to Napoleon. The militias formed detachments and attacked the soldiers of the great army. In general, historians note that before this battle, patriotism was not particularly manifested in Russia. At the same time, it is worth considering that in the country the ordinary population was oppressed by serfdom. The war with the French turned people's minds upside down. The masses of the people, having rallied, felt their ability to resist the enemy. It was a victory not only for the army, its command, but for the entire population. Of course, the peasants expected a change in their lives. But, unfortunately, they were disappointed with further events. Nevertheless, the impetus for freethinking and resistance has already been given.
Research by Archpriest Alexander Ilyashenko "Dynamics of the number and losses of the Napoleonic army in the Patriotic War of 1812".
2012 marks two hundred years Patriotic War of 1812 And Battle of Borodino. These events are described by many contemporaries and historians. However, despite many published sources, memoirs and historical studies, there is no established point of view either for the size of the Russian army and its losses in the Battle of Borodino, or for the size and losses of the Napoleonic army. The spread of values is significant both in terms of the number of armies and in terms of losses.
In published in Saint Petersburg in 1838, the "Military Encyclopedic Lexicon" and in the inscription on the Main Monument, installed on the Borodino field in 1838, recorded that at Borodino there were 185 thousand Napoleonic soldiers and officers against 120 thousand Russians. The monument also indicates that the losses of the Napoleonic army amounted to 60 thousand, the losses of the Russian - 45 thousand people (according to modern data - 58 and 44 thousand, respectively).
Along with these estimates, there are others that are radically different from them.
So, in Bulletin No. 18 of the "Great" Army, issued immediately after the Battle of Borodino, the Emperor of France determined the losses of the French at only 10 thousand soldiers and officers.
The spread of estimates is clearly demonstrated by the following data.
Table 1. Estimates of the opposing forces made at different times by different authors
Estimates of the sizes of opposing forces made at different times by different historians
Tab. 1
A similar picture is observed for the losses of the Napoleonic army. In the table below, the losses of the Napoleonic army are presented in ascending order.
Table 2. Losses of the Napoleonic army, according to historians and participants in the battle
Tab. 2
As you can see, indeed, the spread of values is quite large and amounts to several tens of thousands of people. In Table 1, bold type indicates the data of the authors who considered the size of the Russian army to be superior to that of the Napoleonic one. It is interesting to note that Russian historians have joined this point of view only since 1988, i.e. since the beginning of the restructuring.
The most widespread for the size of the Napoleonic army was 130,000, for the Russian - 120,000 people, for losses, respectively - 30,000 and 44,000.
As P.N. Grunberg, starting with the work of General M.I. Bogdanovich "History of the Patriotic War of 1812 according to reliable sources", is recognized for the reliable number of troops great army under Borodino, proposed back in the 1820s. J. de Chambray and J. Pele de Closo. They were guided by the data of the roll call in Gzhatsk on September 2, 1812, but ignored the arrival of reserve units and artillery, which replenished Napoleon's army before the battle.
Many modern historians reject the data indicated on the monument, and some researchers even cause irony. So, A. Vasiliev in the article “Losses of the French army at Borodino” writes that “unfortunately, in our literature on the Patriotic War of 1812, the figure of 58,478 people is very common. It was calculated by the Russian military historian V. A. Afanasiev on the basis of data published in 1813 by order of Rostopchin. The calculations are based on the information of the Swiss adventurer Alexander Schmidt, who in October 1812 defected to the Russians and posed as a major, who allegedly served in the personal office of Marshal Berthier. One cannot agree with this opinion: “General Count Tol, based on official documents recaptured from the enemy during his flight from Russia, counts 185,000 people in the French army, and up to 1,000 artillery pieces.”
The command of the Russian army had the opportunity to rely not only on "official documents captured from the enemy during his flight from Russia", but also on the information of enemy generals and officers who were captured. For example, General Bonami was captured in the Battle of Borodino. The English general Robert Wilson, who was with the Russian army, wrote on December 30, 1812: “Among our prisoners there are at least fifty generals. Their names have been published and will no doubt appear in the English papers.
These generals, as well as the captured officers of the general staff, had reliable information. It can be assumed that it was on the basis of numerous documents and testimonies of captured generals and officers in hot pursuit that Russian military historians restored the true picture of events.
Based on the facts available to us and their numerical analysis, we tried to estimate the number of troops that Napoleon brought to the Borodino field and the losses of his army in the Battle of Borodino.
Table 3 shows the strength of both armies at the battle of Borodino according to the widely held view. Modern domestic historians estimate the losses of the Russian army at 44 thousand soldiers and officers.
Table 3. The number of troops in the battle of Borodino
Tab. 3
At the end of the battle, reserves remained in each army, which did not take a direct part in it. The number of troops of both armies directly involved in the battle, equal to the difference between the total number of troops and the size of the reserves, practically coincides, in terms of artillery, the Napoleonic army was inferior to the Russian one. The losses of the Russian army are one and a half times higher than the losses of the Napoleonic one.
If the proposed picture is true, then why is Borodin's day glorious? Yes, of course, our soldiers fought bravely, but the enemy is braver, ours are skillful, and they are more skillful, our military leaders are experienced, and theirs is more experienced. So which army deserves more admiration? With such a balance of power, an impartial answer is obvious. If we remain impartial, we will also have to admit that Napoleon won another victory.
True, there is some confusion. Of the 1,372 guns that were with the army that crossed the border, about a quarter was distributed to auxiliary areas. Well, of the remaining more than 1,000 guns, only a little more than half were delivered to the Borodino field?
How could Napoleon, who deeply understood the importance of artillery from a young age, allow that not all of the guns, but only some of them, were put up for the decisive battle? To accuse Napoleon of unusual carelessness or inability to ensure the transportation of guns to the battlefield seems absurd. The question is, does the proposed picture correspond to reality and is it possible to put up with such absurdities?
Such puzzling questions are dispelled by data taken from the Monument erected on the Borodino field.
Table 4. The number of troops in the battle of Borodino. Monument
Tab. 4
With such a balance of forces, a completely different picture emerges. Despite the glory of the great commander, Napoleon, possessing one and a half superiority in strength, not only failed to crush the Russian army, but his army suffered losses by 14,000 more than the Russian. The day on which the Russian army withstood the onslaught of superior enemy forces and was able to inflict losses on him, heavier than their own, is undoubtedly the day of glory for the Russian army, the day of valor, honor, courage of its commanders, officers and soldiers.
In our opinion, the problem is fundamental. Either, using the phraseology of Smerdyakov, in the Battle of Borodino the “smart” nation defeated the “stupid”, or the numerous forces of Europe united by Napoleon turned out to be powerless before the greatness of spirit, courage and martial art of the Russian Christ-loving army.
In order to better imagine the course of the war, let us present data characterizing its end. The outstanding German military theorist and historian Karl Clausewitz (1780-1831), an officer in the Prussian army, who was in the war of 1812 under the Russian army, described these events in the book "Campaign to Russia in 1812", published in 1830 shortly before his death.
Based on Shaumbra, Clausewitz estimates the total number of Napoleonic forces that crossed the Russian border during the campaign at 610,000.
When the remnants of the French army gathered in January 1813 across the Vistula, “it turned out that they numbered 23,000 people. The Austrian and Prussian troops who returned from the campaign numbered approximately 35,000 people, therefore, together they amounted to 58,000 people. Meanwhile, the army created, including the troops that subsequently approached here, actually numbered 610,000 people.
Thus, 552,000 people remained killed and captured in Russia. The army had 182,000 horses. Of these, counting the Prussian and Austrian troops and the troops of MacDonald and Rainier, 15,000 survived, therefore, 167,000 were lost. The army had 1,372 guns; the Austrians, Prussians, Macdonald and Rainier brought back with them up to 150 guns, therefore, over 1,200 guns were lost.
The data given by Clausewitz will be summarized in a table.
Table 5. Total losses of the "Great" army in the war of 1812
Tab. 5
Only 10% came back personnel and equipment of the army, proudly calling itself the "Great". History does not know such a thing: an army more than twice as large as its opponent was utterly defeated by him and almost completely destroyed.
Emperor
Before proceeding directly to further research, let's touch on the personality of the Russian Emperor Alexander I, which was subjected to a completely undeserved distortion.
The former French ambassador to Russia, Armand de Caulaincourt, a man close to Napoleon, who moved in the highest political spheres of Europe at that time, recalls that on the eve of the war, in a conversation with him, the Austrian Emperor Franz said that Emperor Alexander
“characterized him as an indecisive, suspicious and influenced sovereign; meanwhile, in matters that can entail such enormous consequences, one must rely only on oneself and, in particular, not go to war before all means of preserving peace have been exhausted.
That is, the Austrian emperor, who betrayed his alliance with Russia, considered the Russian emperor to be soft-bodied and dependent.
From school years, many remember the words:
The ruler is weak and cunning,
Bald dandy, enemy of labor
He reigned over us then.
This false idea about Emperor Alexander, launched in its time by the political elite of the then Europe, was uncritically perceived by liberal domestic historians, as well as by the great Pushkin, and many of his contemporaries and descendants.
The same Caulaincourt preserved the story of de Narbonne, characterizing the Emperor Alexander from a completely different side. De Narbonne was sent by Napoleon to Vilna, where the Emperor Alexander was.
“Emperor Alexander frankly told him from the very beginning:
“I will not draw my sword first. I do not want Europe to make me responsible for the blood that will be shed in this war. For 18 months I have been threatened. French troops are on my borders, 300 leagues from their country. I am at my place for now. They fortify and arm fortresses that almost touch my borders; send troops; incite the Poles. The emperor enriches his treasury and ruins individual unfortunate subjects. I stated that I basically did not want to act in the same way. I don't want to take money out of my subjects' pockets in order to put it into my pocket.
300,000 Frenchmen are preparing to cross my borders, and I still keep the alliance and remain faithful to all my obligations. When I change course, I will do so openly.
He (Napoleon - author) has just called Austria, Prussia and all Europe to arms against Russia, and I am still loyal to the alliance - to such an extent my mind refuses to believe that he wants to sacrifice real benefits to the chances of this war. I have no illusions. I place too high a mark on his military talents not to take into account all the risk to which the lot of war may expose us; but if I have done everything to preserve an honorable peace and a political system that can lead to world peace, then I will not do anything inconsistent with the honor of the nation that I rule. The Russian people are not one of those who retreat in the face of danger.
If all the bayonets of Europe gather on my borders, they will not force me to speak another language. If I have been patient and restrained, it is not because of weakness, but because it is the duty of the sovereign not to listen to the voices of discontent and to have in mind only the calmness and interests of his people when it comes to such big questions, and when he hopes to avoid a struggle that might cost so many sacrifices.
Emperor Alexander told de Narbonne that at the moment he had not yet assumed any obligation contrary to the alliance, that he was confident in his rightness and in the justice of his cause and would defend himself if he was attacked. In conclusion, he opened a map of Russia to him and said, pointing to the distant outskirts:
- If Emperor Napoleon decided to go to war and fate is not favorable to our just cause, then he will have to go to the very end in order to achieve peace.
Then he repeated once again that he would not draw his sword first, but he would sheathe it last.
Thus, a few weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, Emperor Alexander knew that a war was being prepared, that the invasion army already numbered 300 thousand people, pursued a firm policy, guided by the honor of the nation he ruled, knowing that “the Russian people are not one of those who retreat in the face of danger." In addition, we note that the war with Napoleon is not only a war with France, but with a united Europe, since Napoleon "called Austria, Prussia and all of Europe to arms against Russia."
There was no talk of any "treachery" and surprise. The leadership of the Russian Empire and the command of the army had extensive information about the enemy. On the contrary, Caulaincourt emphasizes that
“Prince Ekmyulsky, the general staff and everyone else complained that they had not yet been able to obtain any information, and not a single scout had yet returned from the other side. There, on the other bank, only a few Cossack patrols were visible. The emperor made a review of the troops during the day and once again engaged in reconnaissance of the surroundings. The corps of our right flank knew no more about the movements of the enemy than ours. There was no information about the position of the Russians. Everyone complained that none of the spies returned, which irritated the emperor very much.
The situation did not change with the outbreak of hostilities.
“The Neapolitan king, who commanded the vanguard, often made daytime marches of 10 and 12 leagues. People did not leave the saddle from three o'clock in the morning until 10 o'clock in the evening. The sun, which almost did not descend from the sky, made the emperor forget that the day has only 24 hours. The vanguard was reinforced by carabinieri and cuirassiers; the horses, like the people, were exhausted; we lost a lot of horses; the roads were covered with horse corpses, but the emperor every day, every moment cherished the dream of overtaking the enemy. At any cost, he wanted to get the prisoners; this was the only way to obtain any information about the Russian army, since it could not be obtained through spies, who immediately ceased to be of any use to us as soon as we found ourselves in Russia. The prospect of the whip and Siberia froze the ardor of the most skillful and most fearless of them; to this was added the real difficulty of penetrating the country, and especially the army. Information was received only through Vilna. Nothing came straight through. Our marches were too long and too fast, and our too exhausted cavalry could not send out reconnaissance parties and even flanking patrols. Thus, the emperor most often did not know what was happening two leagues from him. But no matter what price was attached to the capture of prisoners, it was not possible to capture them. The guards of the Cossacks were better than ours; their horses, which were better cared for than ours, proved to be more resilient when attacked, the Cossacks attacked only when the opportunity arose and never got involved in a fight.
By the end of the day, our horses were usually tired to such an extent that the most insignificant collision cost us a few brave men, as their horses fell behind. When our squadrons retreated, it was possible to observe how the soldiers dismounted in the midst of the battle and pulled their horses behind them, while others were even forced to leave their horses and escape on foot. Like everyone else, he (the emperor - author) was surprised by this retreat of the 100,000-strong army, in which there was not a single lagging behind, not a single wagon. For 10 leagues around it was impossible to find any horse for a guide. We had to put guides on our horses; often it was not even possible to find a person who would serve as a guide to the emperor. It happened that the same guide led us three or four days in a row and, in the end, ended up in an area that he knew no better than us.
While the Napoleonic army followed the Russian, not being able to get at least the most insignificant information about its movements, M. I. Kutuzov was appointed commander in chief of the army. On August 29, he "arrived at the army in Tsarevo-Zaimishche, between Gzhatsk and Vyazma, and Emperor Napoleon did not yet know about it."
These testimonies of de Caulaincourt are, in our opinion, a special praise for the unity of the Russian people, so amazing that no reconnaissance and enemy espionage were possible!
Now let's try to trace the dynamics of the processes that led to such an unprecedented defeat. The campaign of 1812 naturally falls into two parts: the offensive and the retreat of the French. We will consider only the first part.
According to Clausewitz, “The war is fought in five separate theaters of war: two to the left of the road leading from Vilna to Moscow make up the left wing, two to the right make up the right wing, and the fifth is the huge center itself.” Clausewitz goes on to write that:
1. Napoleonic Marshal MacDonald, on the lower reaches of the Dvina, with an army of 30,000, is watching the Riga garrison, numbering 10,000 people.
2. Along the middle course of the Dvina (near Polotsk), at first Oudinot with 40,000 men, and later Oudinot and Saint-Cyr with 62,000 men, stood against the Russian General Wittgenstein, whose forces at first reached 15,000 men, and later 50,000.
3. In southern Lithuania, the front to the swamps of Pripyat was Schwarzenberg and Renier with 51,000 people against General Tormasov, who was later joined by Admiral Chichagov with the Moldavian army, a total of 35,000 people.
4. General Dombrovsky with his division and a few cavalry, only 10,000 people, is watching Bobruisk and General Gertel, who is forming a reserve corps of 12,000 people near the city of Mozyr.
5. Finally, in the middle are the main forces of the French, numbering 300,000 people, against the two main Russian armies - Barclay and Bagration - with a force of 120,000 people; these French forces are sent to Moscow to conquer it.
Let's summarize the data given by Clausewitz in a table and add the column "Force ratio".
Table 6. Distribution of forces by directions
Tab. 6
With more than 300,000 soldiers in the center against 120,000 Russian regular troops (Cossack regiments do not belong to regular troops), that is, having an advantage of 185,000 people at the initial stage of the war, Napoleon sought to defeat the Russian army in a pitched battle. The deeper he invaded deep into the territory of Russia, the more acute this need became. But the persecution of the Russian army, exhausting for the center of the "Great" army, contributed to an intensive reduction in its numbers.
The fierceness of the battle of Borodino, its bloodshed, as well as the scale of losses can be judged from a fact that cannot be ignored. Domestic historians, in particular, employees of the museum on the Borodino field, estimate the number of people buried on the field at 48-50 thousand people. And in total, according to the military historian General A.I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, 58,521 bodies were buried or burned on the Borodino field. We can assume that the number of buried or burned bodies is equal to the number of soldiers and officers of both armies who died or died from wounds in the Battle of Borodino.
The data on the losses of the Napoleonic army in the Battle of Borodino were widely disseminated by the data of the French officer Denier, who served as an inspector at the General Staff of Napoleon, presented in Table 7:
Table 7. Losses of the Napoleonic army.
Tab. 7
Denier data, rounded to the nearest 30,000, is currently considered the most reliable. Thus, if we accept that Denier's data are correct, then only the dead will have to fall on the share of losses of the Russian army
58 521 - 6 569 = 51 952 soldiers and officers.
This value significantly exceeds the value of the losses of the Russian army, equal, as indicated above, to 44 thousand, including the dead, the wounded, and the prisoners.
The Denier data are also questionable for the following reasons.
The total losses of both armies near Borodino amounted to 74 thousand, including a thousand prisoners on each side. Subtract from this value the total number of prisoners, we get 72 thousand killed and wounded. In this case, the share of both armies will have only
72,000 - 58,500 = 13,500 wounded,
This means that the ratio between the wounded and killed will be
13 500: 58 500 = 10: 43.
Such a small number of wounded in relation to the number of those killed seems completely implausible.
We are confronted with clear contradictions with the available facts. The losses of the "Great" army in the Battle of Borodino, equal to 30,000 people, are obviously underestimated. We cannot consider such a loss to be realistic.
We will proceed from the fact that the losses of the "Great" army are 58,000 people. Let us estimate the number of killed and wounded of each army.
According to Table 5, which shows Denier's data, 6,569 were killed in the Napoleonic army, 21,517 were wounded, 1,176 officers and soldiers were captured (the number of prisoners will be rounded up to 1,000). Russian soldiers were also captured, about a thousand people. We subtract from the number of losses of each army the number of prisoners, we get, respectively, 43,000 and 57,000 people, in the amount of 100 thousand. We will assume that the number of killed is proportional to the magnitude of the losses.
Then, in the Napoleonic army died
57,000 58,500 / 100,000 = 33,500
wounded
57 000 – 33 500 = 23 500.
Died in the Russian army
58 500 - 33 500 = 25 000,
wounded
43 000 – 25 000 = 18 000.
Table 8. Losses of the Russian and Napoleonic armies
in the battle of Borodino.
Tab. 8
We will try to find additional arguments and with their help justify the realistic value of the losses of the "Great" army in the battle of Borodino.
In further work, we relied on an interesting and very original article by I.P. Artsybashev "Losses of Napoleonic generals on September 5-7, 1812 in the Battle of Borodino". After a thorough study of the sources, I.P. Artsybashev established that in the Battle of Borodino, not 49, as is commonly believed, but 58 generals were out of action. This result is confirmed by the opinion of A. Vasiliev, who writes in this article: “The battle of Borodino was marked by large losses of generals: 26 generals were killed and wounded in the Russian troops, and 50 in the Napoleonic (according to incomplete data).”
After the battles he had given, Napoleon published bulletins containing information about the number and losses of his own and the enemy's army, so far from reality that a saying arose in France: "Lies like a bulletin."
1. Austerlitz. The Emperor of France acknowledged the loss of the French: 800 killed and 1,600 wounded, for a total of 2,400 men. In fact, the losses of the French amounted to 9,200 soldiers and officers.
2. Eylau, Bulletin 58. Napoleon ordered the publication of data on the losses of the French: 1,900 killed and 4,000 wounded, a total of 5,900 people, while the real losses amounted to 25,000 soldiers and officers killed and wounded.
3. Wagram. The emperor agreed to a loss of 1,500 killed and 3,000-4,000 wounded French. Total: 4,500-5,500 soldiers and officers, but in fact 33,900.
4. Smolensk. 13th Bulletin of the "Great Army". Losses 700 French killed and 3,200 wounded. Total: 3,900 people. In fact, French losses amounted to over 12,000 people.
The given data will be summarized in a table
Table 9. Bulletins of Napoleon
Tab. 9
The average underestimation for these four battles is 4.5, therefore, we can assume that Napoleon underestimated the losses of his army by more than four times.
“A lie must be monstrous in order to be believed,” said Dr. Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda of Nazi Germany at one time. Looking at the table above, we have to admit that he had famous predecessors, and he had someone to learn from.
Of course, the accuracy of this estimate is not great, but since Napoleon claimed that his army at Borodino lost 10,000 men, the real losses can be considered to be about 45,000 men. These considerations are of a qualitative nature; we will try to find more accurate estimates on the basis of which we can draw quantitative conclusions. To do this, we will rely on the ratio of generals and soldiers of the Napoleonic army.
Consider the well-described battles of the empire of 1805-1815, in which the number of Napoleonic generals out of action is more than 10.
Table 10. Losses of disabled generals and disabled soldiers
Tab. 10
On average, there are 958 soldiers and officers who are out of action for one general who is out of action. This - random value, its variance is 86. We will proceed from the fact that in the Battle of Borodino, there were 958 ± 86 soldiers and officers who were out of action for one general who was out of action.
958 58 = 55,500 people.
The dispersion of this value is equal to
86 58 = 5000.
With a probability of 0.95, the true value of the losses of the Napoleonic army lies in the range from 45,500 to 65,500 people. The loss of 30-40 thousand lies outside this interval and, therefore, is statistically insignificant and can be discarded. In contrast, the loss of 58,000 lies within this confidence interval and can be considered significant.
As we moved deeper into the territory of the Russian Empire, the size of the "Great" army was greatly reduced. Moreover, the main reason for this was not combat losses, but losses caused by the exhaustion of people, the lack of sufficient food, drinking water, hygiene and sanitation and other conditions necessary to ensure the march of such a large army.
Napoleon's goal in a swift campaign, using the superiority of forces and his own outstanding military leadership, was to defeat the Russian army in a general battle and dictate his terms from a position of strength. Contrary to expectations, it was not possible to impose a battle, because the Russian army maneuvered so skillfully and set such a pace of movement that the “Great” army withstood with great difficulty, experiencing hardships and in need of everything necessary.
The principle of “war feeds itself”, which has proven itself well in Europe, turned out to be practically inapplicable in Russia with its distances, forests, swamps and, most importantly, a recalcitrant population that did not want to feed the enemy army. But the Napoleonic soldiers suffered not only from hunger, but also from thirst. This circumstance did not depend on the desire of the surrounding peasants, but was an objective factor.
First, unlike in Europe, in Russia the settlements are quite far apart. Secondly, there are as many wells in them as necessary to meet the needs of residents in drinking water, but not enough for the many passing soldiers. Thirdly, the Russian army was ahead, the soldiers of which drank these wells "to the mud", as he writes in the novel "War and Peace".
The lack of water also led to the unsatisfactory sanitary condition of the army. This entailed fatigue and exhaustion of the soldiers, caused their diseases, as well as the death of horses. All this taken together entailed significant non-combat losses of the Napoleonic army.
We will consider the change over time in the size of the center of the "Great" army. The table below uses Clausewitz's data on the change in the size of the army.
Table 11. The size of the "Great" army
Tab. eleven
In the column "Number" of this table, based on Clausewitz's data, the number of soldiers of the center of the "Great" army on the border, on the 52nd day near Smolensk, on the 75th near Borodino and on the 83rd at the time of entry into Moscow are presented. To ensure the security of the army, as Clausewitz notes, detachments were allocated to guard communications, flanks, etc. The number of soldiers in service is the sum of the two previous values. As we can see from the table, on the way from the border to the Borodino field, the "Great" army lost
301,000 - 157,000 = 144,000 people,
that is, slightly less than 50% of its initial population.
After the battle of Borodino, the Russian army retreated, the Napoleonic army continued the pursuit. The fourth corps, under the command of the Viceroy of Italy, Eugene Beauharnais, moved through Ruza to Zvenigorod in order to get in the way of the retreat of the Russian army, detain it and force it to accept the battle with the main forces of Napoleon in unfavorable conditions. The detachment of Major General F.F. sent to Zvenigorod Winzengerode delayed the viceroy's corps for six hours. Russian troops occupied a hill, resting their right flank against a ravine, their left against a swamp. The slope facing the enemy was a plowed field. Natural obstacles on the flanks, as well as loose earth, fettered the maneuver of enemy infantry and cavalry. A well-chosen position allowed a small detachment to "provide vigorous resistance, costing the French several thousand killed and wounded."
We accepted that in the battle near Krymsky the losses of the "Great" army amounted to four thousand people. The rationale for this choice will be given below.
The column “Hypothetical strength” represents the number of soldiers who would have remained in the ranks if there were no combat losses and no detachments were allocated for protection, that is, if the size of the army was reduced only because of the difficulties of the march. Then the hypothetical size of the center of the army should be a smooth, monotonically decreasing curve, and it can be approximated by some function n(t).
Let us assume that the rate of change of the approximating function is directly proportional to its current value, i.e.
dn/dt = -λn.
Then
n(t) = n0 e- λ t ,
where n0 is the initial number of troops, n0 = 301 thousand.
The hypothetical number is related to the real one - it is the sum of the real number with the number of troops allocated for protection, as well as with the amount of losses in battles. But we must take into account that if there were no battles, and the soldiers would remain in the ranks, then their number would also decrease over time at the rate at which the size of the entire army was reduced. For example, if there were no battles and no guards were allocated, then in Moscow there would be
90 + (12 e- 23 λ + 30) e- 8 λ + 4 + 13 = 144.3 thousand soldiers.
The coefficients at λ are the number of days that have passed since the given battle.
The parameter λ is found from the condition
Σ (n(ti) – ni)2= min, (1)
where ni are taken from the line “Hypothetical population”, ti is the number of days in a day from the moment of crossing the border.
Relative losses per day is a value that characterizes the intensity of change in the hypothetical population. It is calculated as the logarithm of the ratio of the number at the beginning and at the end of a given period to the duration of this period. For example, for the first period:
ln(301/195.5) / 52 = 0.00830 1/day
Attention is drawn to the high intensity of non-combat losses during the pursuit of the Russian army from the border to Smolensk. On the transition from Smolensk to Borodino, the intensity of losses decreases by 20%, this is obviously due to the fact that the pace of pursuit has decreased. But on the transition from Borodino to Moscow, the intensity, we emphasize, of non-combat losses increases by two and a half times. The sources do not mention any epidemics that would cause increased morbidity and mortality. This once again suggests that the losses of the "Great" army in the battle of Borodino, which according to Denier is 30 thousand, are underestimated.
Again, we will proceed from the fact that the number of the "Great" army on the Borodino field was 185 thousand, and its losses - 58 thousand. But at the same time, we are faced with a contradiction: according to the data of Table 9, there were 130 thousand Napoleonic soldiers and officers on the Borodino field. This contradiction, in our opinion, is removed by the following assumption.
The general staff of the Napoleonic army recorded the number of soldiers who crossed the border with Napoleon on June 24 on one sheet, and suitable reinforcements on the other. The fact that reinforcements were coming is a fact. In a report to Emperor Alexander dated August 23 (September 4, NS), Kutuzov wrote: “Several officers and sixty privates were taken prisoners yesterday. According to the numbers of the corps to which these prisoners belong, there is no doubt that the enemy is concentrated. The fifth battalions of the French regiments arrive successively to him.
According to Clausewitz, “during the campaign, 33,000 more men came up with Marshal Victor, 27,000 with the divisions of Dyurutte and Loison, and 80,000 other reinforcements, therefore, about 140,000 people.” Marshal Victor and the divisions of Dyurutte and Loison joined up with the "Great" Army long after it had left Moscow and could not take part in the battle of Borodino.
Of course, the number of reinforcements on the march was also declining, so out of 80 thousand soldiers who crossed the border, Borodino reached
185 - 130 = 55 thousand top-ups.
Then we can assert that on the Borodino field there were 130 thousand soldiers of the “Great” army proper, as well as 55 thousand reinforcements, the presence of which remained “in the shadows”, and that the total number of Napoleonic troops should be taken equal to 185 thousand people. Let us assume that the losses are proportional to the number of troops directly involved in the battle. Provided that 18 thousand remained in the reserve of the "Great" army, the losses taken into account are
58 (130 - 18) / (185 - 18) = 39 thousand.
This value agrees surprisingly well with the data of the French General Segur and a number of other researchers. We will assume that their assessment is more true, that is, we will assume that the value of the recorded losses is 40 thousand people. In this case, the "shadow" losses will be
58 - 40 = 18 thousand people.
Therefore, we can assume that double bookkeeping was carried out in the Napoleonic army: some of the soldiers went through one list, some - according to others. This applies to both the total strength of the army and its losses.
With the found value of accounted losses, condition (1) is satisfied with the value of the approximation parameter λ equal to 0.00804 1/day and the value of losses in the battle at Krymsky - 4 thousand soldiers and officers. In this case, the approximating function approximates the value of hypothetical losses with a fairly high accuracy of about 2%. Such an accuracy of approximation indicates the validity of the assumption that the rate of change of the approximating function is directly proportional to its current value.
Using the results obtained, we will create a new table:
Table 12. The number of the center of the "Great" army
Tab. 12
We now see that the relative losses per day are in fairly good agreement with each other.
At λ = 0.00804 1/day, daily non-combat losses were 2,400 at the beginning of the campaign and slightly more than 800 per day when approaching Moscow.
To be able to take a closer look at the Battle of Borodino, we proposed a numerical model for the dynamics of the losses of both armies in the Battle of Borodino. The mathematical model provides additional material for analyzing whether a given set of initial conditions corresponds to reality or not, helps to discard extreme points, and also choose the most realistic option.
We assumed that the losses of one army in this moment time is directly proportional to the current strength of the other. Of course, we are aware that such a model is very imperfect. It does not take into account the division of the army into infantry, cavalry and artillery, nor does it take into account such important factors as the talent of generals, the valor and military skill of soldiers and officers, the effectiveness of command and control of troops, their equipment, etc. But, since opponents of approximately equal level opposed each other, even such an imperfect model will give qualitatively plausible results.
Based on this assumption, we obtain a system of two ordinary linear differential equations first order:
dx/dt = -py
dy/dt = - qx
The initial conditions are x0 and y0 – the number of armies before the battle and the value of their losses at the time t0 = 0: x’0 = - py0; y'0 = - qx0.
The battle continued until dark, but the most bloody actions, which brought the greatest number of losses, continued until the Raevsky battery was taken by the French, then the intensity of the battle subsided. Therefore, we will assume that the active phase of the battle lasted ten hours.
Solving this system, we find the dependence of the size of each army on time, and also, knowing the losses of each army, the coefficients of proportionality, i.e., the intensity with which the soldiers of one army hit the soldiers of the other.
x = x0 ch (ωt) - p y0 sh (ωt) / ω
y = y0 ch (ωt) - q x0 sh (ωt) / ω,
where ω = (pq)1.
Table 7 below presents data on losses, the number of troops before and after the battle, taken from various sources. Data on the intensity, as well as on losses in the first and last hour battles are obtained from our proposed mathematical model.
When analyzing numerical data, we must proceed from the fact that opponents confronted each other approximately equal in training, technology and high professional level, both ordinary soldiers and officers, and army commanders. But we must also take into account the fact that “Under Borodino, things were going on - to be or not to be Russia. This battle is our own, our own battle. In this sacred lottery, we were the contributors to everything inseparable from our political existence: all our past glory, all our real national honor, national pride, the greatness of the Russian name - all our future destiny.
During a fierce battle with a numerically superior enemy, the Russian army retreated somewhat, retaining order, control, artillery and combat capability. The advancing side suffers greater losses than the defending side until it has defeated its opponent and he has not turned to flight. But the Russian army did not flinch and did not run.
This circumstance gives us reason to believe that the total losses of the Russian army should be less than the losses of the Napoleonic one. It is impossible not to take into account such an intangible factor as the spirit of the army, to which the great Russian commanders attached such great importance, and which Leo Tolstoy so subtly noted. It is expressed in valor, stamina, the ability to hit the enemy. We can, of course, conditionally assume that this factor in our model is reflected in the intensity with which the soldiers of one army hit the soldiers of another.
Table 13. Number of troops and losses of the parties
Tab. 13
The first line of Table 13 shows the values of the initial strength and losses indicated in Bulletin No. 18 of the "Great Army" issued by Napoleon. With such a ratio of the initial strength and the magnitude of losses, according to our model, it turns out that during the battle the losses of the Russian army would be 3-4 times higher than the losses of the Napoleonic one, and the Napoleonic soldiers fought 3 times more effectively than the Russians. With such a course of battle, it would seem that the Russian army should have been defeated, but this did not happen. Therefore, this set of initial data is not true and must be rejected.
The next line presents the results based on data from the French professors Lavisse and Rambeau. As our model shows, the losses of the Russian army would be almost three and a half times higher than the losses of the Napoleonic one. In the last hour of the battle, the Napoleonic army would lose less than 2% of its composition, and the Russian - more than 12%.
The question is, why did Napoleon stop the battle if the Russian army was expected to be defeated soon? This is contradicted by eyewitness accounts. We cite Caulaincourt's testimony about the events that followed the capture of the Rayevsky battery by the French, as a result of which the Russian army was forced to retreat.
“A sparse wood covered their passage and hid from us their movements in this place. The emperor hoped that the Russians would hasten their retreat, and expected to throw his cavalry at them in order to try to break the line of enemy troops. Parts of the Young Guard and the Poles were already moving in order to approach the fortifications that remained in the hands of the Russians. The emperor, in order to better observe their movements, went ahead and went right up to the very line of shooters. Bullets whistled around him; he left his retinue behind. The emperor was at this moment in great danger, as the firing became so hot that the Neapolitan king and several generals rushed to persuade and beg the emperor to leave.
The emperor then went to the approaching columns. The old guard followed him; carabinieri and cavalry marched in echelons. The emperor, apparently, decided to capture the last enemy fortifications, but the prince of Neuchâtel and the King of Naples pointed out to him that these troops did not have a commander, that almost all divisions and many regiments also lost their commanders, who were killed or wounded; the number of cavalry and infantry regiments, as the emperor can see, has been greatly reduced; the time is already late; the enemy is really retreating, but in such order, maneuvering and defending the position with such courage, although our artillery crushes his army masses, that one cannot hope for success unless the old guard is attacked; in this state of affairs, the success achieved at this price would be a failure, and the failure would be such a loss as to cancel out the gain of the battle; finally, they drew the attention of the emperor to the fact that one should not risk the only hull that still remains intact, and that it should be reserved for other occasions. The Emperor hesitated. He again went forward to observe the movements of the enemy himself.
The emperor “made sure that the Russians were in position, and that many corps not only did not retreat, but were concentrated together and, apparently, were going to cover the retreat of the rest of the troops. All the reports that followed one after another said that our losses were very significant. The Emperor has made a decision. He canceled the order to attack and limited himself to an order to support the corps still fighting in case the enemy tried to do something, which was unlikely, since he also suffered enormous losses. The battle ended only at nightfall. Both sides were so tired that at many points the shooting stopped without a command.
The third line contains the data of General Mikhnevich. The very high losses of the Russian army are striking. The loss of more than half of its initial composition cannot be sustained by any army, even the Russian one. In addition, the estimates of modern researchers agree that the Russian army lost 44 thousand people in the battle. Therefore, these initial data seem to us to be untrue and must be discarded.
Consider the data of the fourth line. With such a balance of power, our model shows that the Napoleonic army fought extremely effectively and inflicted heavy losses on its enemy. Our model allows us to consider some possible situations. If the size of the armies were the same, then with the same efficiency, the size of the Russian army would be reduced by 40%, and the Napoleonic one by 20%. But the facts contradict such assumptions. In the battle of Maloyaroslavets, the forces were equal, and for the Napoleonic army it was not about victory, but about life. Nevertheless, the Napoleonic army was forced to retreat and return to the devastated Smolensk road, dooming itself to hunger and hardship. In addition, we showed above that the loss of 30 thousand is underestimated, so Vasiliev's data should be excluded from consideration.
According to the data given in the fifth line, the relative losses of the Napoleonic army, which are 43%, exceed the relative losses of the Russian army, equal to 37%. It cannot be expected that the European soldiers who fought for winter quarters and the opportunity to profit by plundering a defeated country could withstand such high relative losses, exceeding the relative losses of the Russian army, which fought for its Fatherland and defended the Orthodox faith from the atheists. Therefore, although these data are based on the ideas of modern domestic scientists, nevertheless, they seem unacceptable to us.
Let's move on to the consideration of the data of the sixth line: the number of the Napoleonic army is assumed to be 185 thousand, the Russian - 120 thousand, the losses - 58 and 44 thousand people. According to our model, the losses of the Russian army throughout the entire battle are somewhat lower than the losses of the Napoleonic one. Let's pay attention to an important detail. The effectiveness with which the Russian soldiers fought was twice that of their opponents! The late veteran of the Great Patriotic War, to the question: “What is war?”, Answered: “War is work, hard, dangerous work, and it must be done faster and better than the enemy.” This fully corresponds to the words of the famous poem by M.Yu. Lermontov:
The enemy knew a lot that day,
What does the Russian fight remote mean,
Our hand to hand combat!
This gives us reason to understand why Napoleon did not send his guards into the fire. The valiant Russian army fought more effectively than its opponent and, despite the inequality of forces, inflicted heavier losses on him. It is impossible not to take into account the fact that the losses in the last hour of the battle were almost the same. Under such conditions, Napoleon could not count on the defeat of the Russian army, just as he could not exhaust the strength of his army in a battle that had become hopeless. The results of the analysis allow us to accept the data presented in the sixth row of Table 13.
So, the number of the Russian army was 120 thousand people, Napoleonic - 185 thousand, respectively, the loss of the Russian army - 44 thousand, Napoleonic - 58 thousand.
Now we can make the final table.
Table 14. The number and losses of the Russian and Napoleonic armies
in the battle of Borodino.
Tab. 14
The valor, selflessness, martial art of the Russian generals, officers and soldiers, who inflicted huge losses on the "Great" army, forced Napoleon to abandon the decision to bring his last reserve into action at the end of the battle - the guards corps, since even the guards could not achieve decisive success. He did not expect to meet such exceptionally skillful and fierce resistance from Russian soldiers, because
And we promised to die
And the oath of allegiance was kept
We are in the battle of Borodino.
At the end of the battle, M. I. Kutuzov wrote to Alexander I: “This day will remain an eternal monument to the courage and excellent courage of Russian soldiers, where all the infantry, cavalry and artillery fought desperately. Everyone's desire was to die on the spot and not yield to the enemy. The French army, under the leadership of Napoleon himself, being in excellent strength, did not overcome the firmness of spirit Russian soldier who sacrificed his life with courage for his fatherland.
With cheerfulness, everyone sacrificed their lives for their fatherland, from a soldier to a general.
“Confirm in all companies,” Artillery Chief Kutaisov wrote on the eve of Borodin, “so that they do not withdraw from the position until the enemy sits astride guns. To tell the commanders and all the gentlemen of the officers that only by bravely holding on to the closest shot of grapeshot can we achieve that the enemy does not give up a single step of our position.
Artillery must sacrifice itself. Let them take you with guns, but fire the last shot at close range... If the battery had been taken behind all this, although you can almost vouch for the opposite, then it has already fully atoned for the loss of guns... ".
It should be noted that these were not empty words: General Kutaisov himself died in battle, and the French were able to capture only a dozen guns.
The task of Napoleon in the battle of Borodino, as well as at the stage of persecution, was the complete defeat of the Russian army, its destruction. A large numerical superiority is required to defeat an enemy approximately equal in terms of military skill. Napoleon concentrated 300 thousand in the main direction against the Russian army of 120 thousand. Possessing an initial superiority of 180,000, Napoleon was unable to maintain it. “With greater care and a better organization of the food business, with a more deliberate organization of marches, in which huge masses of troops would not be uselessly crowded together on one road, he could have prevented the famine that reigned in his army from the very beginning of the campaign, and thereby preserving it in a more complete composition.
Huge non-combat losses, indicating a disdain for their own soldiers, who for Napoleon were just "cannon fodder", were the reason that in the Battle of Borodino, although he had one and a half superiority, he lacked one or two corps to deliver a decisive blow . Napoleon could not achieve the main goal - the defeat and destruction of the Russian army, neither at the stage of persecution, nor in the battle of Borodino. The failure to fulfill the tasks facing Napoleon is an indisputable achievement of the Russian army, which, thanks to the skill of command, the courage and valor of officers and soldiers, wrested success from the enemy at the first stage of the war, which caused his heavy defeat and complete defeat.
“Of all my battles, the most terrible is the one I fought near Moscow. The French in it showed themselves worthy of victory, and the Russians acquired the right to be invincible, ”Napoleon wrote later.
As for the Russian army, during the most difficult, brilliantly conducted strategic retreat, in which not a single rearguard battle was lost, it retained its strength. The tasks that Kutuzov set for himself in the battle of Borodino - to save his army, to bleed and deplete Napoleon's army - were just as brilliantly fulfilled.
On the Borodino field, the Russian army withstood one and a half times the numerically superior army of Europe united by Napoleon and inflicted significant losses on its enemy. Yes, indeed, the battle near Moscow was "the most terrible" of those given by Napoleon, and he himself admitted that "the Russians have acquired the right to be invincible." One cannot but agree with this assessment of the Emperor of France.
Notes:
1 Military encyclopedic lexicon. Part two. SPb. 1838. S. 435-445.
2 P.A. Zhilin. M. Science. 1988, p. 170.
3 Battle of Borodino from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. We have corrected errors in the 4th and 15th lines, in which the compilers rearranged the numbers of the Russian and Napoleonic armies.
4 Artsybashev I.P. Losses of Napoleonic generals on September 5-7, 1812 in the Battle of Borodino.
5 Grunberg P.N. On the strength of the Great Army in the battle of Borodino // The era of the Napoleonic wars: people, events, ideas. Materials V-th All-Russian scientific conference. Moscow April 25, 2002. M. 2002. S. 45-71.
6A. Vasiliev. "Losses of the French army at Borodino" "Motherland", No. 6/7, 1992. S.68-71.
7 Military encyclopedic lexicon. Part two. SPb. 1838. S. 438
8 Robert Wilson. "Diary of travels, service and social events when he was with the European armies during the campaigns of 1812-1813. SPb. 1995 p. 108.
9 According to Shaumbra, from whom we generally borrowed data on the size of the French armed forces, we determined the size of the French army when it entered Russia at 440,000 people. During the campaign, another 33,000 people approached with Marshal Victor, 27,000 with the divisions of Dyurutte and Loison, and 80,000 other reinforcements, therefore, about 140,000 people. The rest are convoy parts. (Note Clausewitz). Clausewitz. Campaign to Russia in 1812. Moscow. 1997, p. 153.
10 Clausewitz. Campaign to Russia in 1812. Moscow. 1997, p. 153.
11 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk. 1991. P.69.
12 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk. 1991, p. 70.
13 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk. 1991. S. 77.
14 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk. 1991. S. 177,178.
15 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk. 1991, p. 178.
16 Clausewitz. 1812. Moscow. 1997, p. 127.
17 Rodina, No. 2, 2005
18 http://ukus.com.ua/ukus/works/view/63
19 Clausewitz. Campaign to Russia in 1812. Moscow. 1997 p. 137-138.
20 M.I. Kutuzov. Letters, notes. Moscow. 1989 p. 320.
21 Denis Davydov. Library for reading, 1835, v.12.
22 E. Lavisse, A. Rambeau, “History of the 19th century”, M. 1938, vol. 2, p. 265
23 "Patriotic War and Russian society". Volume IV.
24 A. Vasiliev. "Losses of the French army at Borodino" "Motherland", No. 6/7, 1992. S.68-71.
25 P.A. Zhilin. M. Science. 1988, p. 170.
26 Armand de Caulaincourt. Memoirs. Smolensk. 1991. S. 128,129.
27 M.I. Kutuzov. Letters, notes. Moscow. 1989 p. 336
28 M. Bragin. Kutuzov. ZhZL. M. 1995. p.116.
29 Clausewitz. 1812. Moscow. 1997, p. 122.
The official reason for the war was the violation of the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit by Russia and France. Russia, despite the blockade of England, received its ships under neutral flags in its ports. France annexed the Duchy of Oldenburg to its possessions. Napoleon considered it insulting to himself the demand of Emperor Alexander for the withdrawal of troops from the Duchy of Warsaw and Prussia. The War of 1812 was becoming inevitable.
Here summary Patriotic War of 1812. Napoleon, at the head of a huge army of 600,000, crossed the Neman on June 12, 1812. Russian army, numbering only 240 thousand people, was forced to retreat deep into the country. In the battle of Smolensk, Bonaparte failed to win a complete victory and defeat the united 1st and 2nd Russian armies.
In August, Kutuzov M.I. was appointed commander in chief. He not only possessed the talent of a strategist, but also enjoyed respect among soldiers and officers. He decided to give a general battle to the French near the village of Borodino. The positions for the Russian troops were chosen most successfully. The left flank was protected by flushes (earth fortifications), and the right flank by the Koloch River. In the center were the troops of Raevsky N.N. and artillery.
Both sides fought desperately. 400 guns were fired at the flushes, which were courageously guarded by the troops under the command of Bagration. As a result of 8 attacks, the Napoleonic troops suffered huge losses. They managed to capture the batteries of Raevsky (in the center) only at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, but not for long. The attacking impulse of the French was held back thanks to a bold raid by the lancers of the 1st Cavalry Corps. Despite all the difficulties to bring into battle the old guard, elite troops, Napoleon did not dare. Late in the evening the battle was over. The losses were huge. The French lost 58, and the Russians 44 thousand people. Paradoxically, both commanders declared their victory in the battle.
The decision to leave Moscow was made by Kutuzov at a council in Fili on September 1. It was the only way to keep a combat-ready army. September 2, 1812 Napoleon entered Moscow. While waiting for an offer of peace, Napoleon stayed in the city until 7 October. As a result of fires, most of Moscow perished during this time. Peace with Alexander 1 was never concluded.
Kutuzov stopped 80 km away. from Moscow in the village of Tarutino. He covered Kaluga, which has large stocks of fodder and the arsenals of Tula. The Russian army, thanks to this maneuver, was able to replenish its reserves and, importantly, upgrade equipment. At the same time, French foragers were subjected to guerrilla attacks. Detachments of Vasilisa Kozhina, Fyodor Potapov, Gerasim Kurin delivered effective strikes, depriving the French army of the opportunity to replenish food. In the same way, special detachments of Davydov A.V. and Seslavina A.N.
After leaving Moscow, Napoleon's army failed to break through to Kaluga. The French were forced to retreat along the Smolensk road, without fodder. Early severe frosts exacerbated the situation. final rout The Great Army took place in the battle near the Berezina River on November 14 - 16, 1812. Of the 600,000-strong army, only 30,000 hungry and frozen soldiers left Russia. The manifesto on the victorious end of the Patriotic War was issued by Alexander 1 on December 25 of the same year. The victory of 1812 was complete.
In 1813 and 1814, the campaign of the Russian army took place, liberating the European countries from the domination of Napoleon. Russian troops acted in alliance with the armies of Sweden, Austria, Prussia. As a result, in accordance with the Treaty of Paris on May 18, 1814, Napoleon lost his throne, and France returned to the borders of 1793.
On June 24 (June 12, old style), 1812, the Patriotic War began - the liberation war of Russia against Napoleonic aggression.
The invasion of the troops of the French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte into the Russian Empire was caused by the aggravation of Russian-French economic and political contradictions, the actual refusal of Russia to participate in the continental blockade (the system of economic and political measures used by Napoleon I in the war with England), etc.
Napoleon aspired to world domination, Russia interfered with the implementation of his plans. He hoped, inflicting the main blow on the right flank of the Russian army in the general direction of Vilna (Vilnius), to defeat it in one or two pitched battles, capture Moscow, force Russia to capitulate and dictate a peace treaty to her on favorable terms.
On June 24 (June 12, old style), 1812, Napoleon's "Great Army" crossed the Neman and invaded the Russian Empire without declaring war. It numbered over 440 thousand people and had a second echelon, in which there were 170 thousand people. The "Great Army" included in its composition the troops of all the countries conquered by Napoleon Western Europe(French troops made up only half of its strength). She was opposed by three Russian armies, far apart from each other, with a total number of 220-240 thousand people. Initially, only two of them acted against Napoleon - the first, under the command of General of Infantry Mikhail Barclay de Tolly, covering the St. Petersburg direction, and the second, under the command of General of Infantry Pyotr Bagration, concentrated on the Moscow direction. The third army of cavalry general Alexander Tormasov covered the southwestern borders of Russia and began hostilities at the end of the war. At the beginning of hostilities, the general leadership of the Russian forces was carried out by Emperor Alexander I, in July 1812 he transferred the main command to Barclay de Tolly.
Four days after the invasion of Russia, French troops occupied Vilna. On July 8 (June 26, old style) they entered Minsk.
Having figured out Napoleon's plan to separate the Russian first and second armies and defeat them one by one, the Russian command began a systematic withdrawal of them for connection. Instead of a phased dismemberment of the enemy, the French troops were forced to move behind the elusive Russian armies, stretching communications and losing superiority in forces. Retreating, the Russian troops fought rearguard battles (a battle undertaken with the aim of delaying the advancing enemy and thus ensuring the retreat of the main forces), inflicting significant losses on the enemy.
To help the army to repel the invasion of the Napoleonic army on Russia, on the basis of the manifesto of Alexander I of July 18 (July 6, according to the old style), 1812 and his appeal to the inhabitants of the "Mother-throne capital of our Moscow" with a call to act as initiators, temporary armed formations began to form - people's militia. This allowed the Russian government to mobilize large human and material resources for the war in a short time.
Napoleon sought to prevent the connection of the Russian armies. On July 20 (July 8, according to the old style), the French occupied Mogilev and prevented the Russian armies from connecting in the Orsha region. Only thanks to stubborn rearguard battles and the high skill of the maneuver carried out by the Russian armies, which managed to frustrate the enemy's plans, did they unite near Smolensk on August 3 (July 22, old style), keeping their main forces combat-ready. The first big battle of the Patriotic War of 1812 took place here. The battle of Smolensk lasted three days: from 16 to 18 August (from 4 to 6 August, old style). The Russian regiments repulsed all the attacks of the French and retreated only on orders, leaving the burning city to the enemy. Almost all the inhabitants left it with the troops. After the battles for Smolensk, the united Russian armies continued to withdraw in the direction of Moscow.
The retreat strategy of Barclay de Tolly, unpopular either in the army or in Russian society, leaving the enemy a significant territory forced Emperor Alexander I to establish the post of commander-in-chief of all Russian armies and on August 20 (August 8, old style) to appoint General of Infantry Mikhail Golenishchev- Kutuzov, who had great combat experience and was popular both among the Russian army and among the nobility. The emperor not only put him at the head of the army in the field, but also subordinated to him the militias, reserves and civil authorities in the provinces affected by the war.
Based on the requirements of Emperor Alexander I, the mood of the army, eager to give the enemy a fight, the commander-in-chief Kutuzov decided, relying on a pre-selected position, 124 kilometers from Moscow, near the village of Borodino near Mozhaisk, to give the French army a general battle in order to inflict as much damage as possible on it and stop the advance on Moscow.
By the beginning of the Battle of Borodino, the Russian army had 132 (according to other sources 120) thousand people, the French - about 130-135 thousand people.
It was preceded by a battle for the Shevardinsky redoubt, which began on September 5 (August 24, old style), in which Napoleon's troops, despite more than threefold superiority in strength, managed to capture the redoubt only by the end of the day with great difficulty. This battle allowed Kutuzov to unravel the plan of Napoleon I and to strengthen his left wing in a timely manner.
The battle of Borodino began at five o'clock in the morning on September 7 (August 26, old style) and lasted until 20 o'clock in the evening. Napoleon did not succeed in the whole day either to break through the Russian position in the center, or to go around it from the flanks. The private tactical successes of the French army - the Russians retreated from their original position by about one kilometer - did not become victorious for her. Late in the evening, the disorganized and bloodless French troops were withdrawn to their original positions. The Russian field fortifications they took were so destroyed that there was no longer any point in holding them. Napoleon failed to defeat the Russian army. In the Battle of Borodino, the French lost up to 50 thousand people, the Russians - over 44 thousand people.
Since the losses in the battle turned out to be huge, and the reserves were used up, the Russian army left the Borodino field, retreating to Moscow, while conducting rearguard battles. On September 13 (September 1, according to the old style), at the military council in Fili, the decision of the commander-in-chief "for the sake of preserving the army and Russia" to leave Moscow to the enemy without a fight was supported by a majority of votes. The next day, Russian troops left the capital. Most of the population left the city with them. On the very first day of the entry of French troops into Moscow, fires began, devastating the city. For 36 days, Napoleon languished in the burned-out city, waiting in vain for a response to his proposal to Alexander I for peace, on favorable terms for him.
The main Russian army, leaving Moscow, made a march maneuver and settled in the Tarutinsky camp, reliably covering the south of the country. From here, Kutuzov launched a small war with the forces of army partisan detachments. During this time, the peasantry of the Great Russian provinces, engulfed in war, rose to a large-scale people's war.
Napoleon's attempts to enter into negotiations were rejected.
On October 18 (October 6, according to the old style), after the battle on the Chernishna River (near the village of Tarutino), in which the vanguard of the "Great Army" under the command of Marshal Murat was defeated, Napoleon left Moscow and sent his troops towards Kaluga to break into the southern Russian provinces rich in food resources. Four days after the departure of the French, the advance detachments of the Russian army entered the capital.
After the battle of Maloyaroslavets on October 24 (October 12, old style), when the Russian army blocked the enemy's path, Napoleon's troops were forced to begin a retreat along the devastated old Smolensk road. Kutuzov organized the pursuit of the French along the roads south of the Smolensk tract, acting as strong vanguards. Napoleon's troops lost people not only in clashes with their pursuers, but also from partisan attacks, from hunger and cold.
To the flanks of the retreating French army, Kutuzov pulled troops from the south and north-west of the country, who began to actively operate and inflict defeat on the enemy. Napoleon's troops actually found themselves surrounded on the Berezina River near the city of Borisov (Belarus), where on November 26-29 (November 14-17, old style) they fought with Russian troops who tried to cut off their escape routes. The French emperor, having misled the Russian command with a false crossing, was able to transfer the remnants of the troops along two hastily built bridges across the river. On November 28 (November 16, old style), Russian troops attacked the enemy on both banks of the Berezina, but, despite the superiority of forces, due to indecision and incoherence of actions, they were not successful. On the morning of November 29 (November 17, old style), by order of Napoleon, the bridges were burned. Convoys and crowds of lagging behind French soldiers (about 40 thousand people) remained on the left bank, most of whom drowned during the crossing or were captured, and the total losses of the French army in the battle of the Berezina amounted to 50 thousand people. But Napoleon in this battle managed to avoid complete defeat and retreat to Vilna.
The liberation of the territory of the Russian Empire from the enemy ended on December 26 (December 14, old style), when Russian troops occupied the border cities of Bialystok and Brest-Litovsky. The enemy lost up to 570 thousand people on the battlefields. The losses of the Russian troops amounted to about 300 thousand people.
The official end of the Patriotic War of 1812 is considered to be a manifesto signed by Emperor Alexander I on January 6, 1813 (December 25, 1812 according to the old style), in which he announced that he had kept his word not to stop the war until the enemy was completely expelled from the territory of Russia. empire.
The defeat and death of the "Great Army" in Russia created the conditions for the liberation of the peoples of Western Europe from Napoleonic tyranny and predetermined the collapse of Napoleon's empire. The Patriotic War of 1812 showed the complete superiority of Russian military art over the military art of Napoleon, and caused a nationwide patriotic upsurge in Russia.
(Additional
Loading...